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State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey:  
Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public Sphere 
Talip Kucukcan∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey occupies a unique place among the modern nation states. 
Not only from a geopolitical point of view but also from cultural and 
religious points of view; Turkey lies at the crossroads between 
Eastern and Western interests. The political and cultural identity of 
modern Turkey emerged under the influence of domestic and 
external forces that existed in and around Turkey throughout the 
centuries. Since modern Turkey was established on the ruins of the 
Ottoman Empire, periods of conflict and cooperation between 
Turkey and other political entities, such as Europe and the Middle 
East, have led to the development of the modern Turkish state and 
influenced its move toward modernization. 
The establishment of a modern Turkey based on Western 
political models was a watershed in Turkey’s history as an Islamic 
empire. The early republican elite distanced themselves from the 
cultural and ideological heritage of the Ottoman Empire and laid the 
foundational elements of modernization and westernization.1 These 
foundational elements were vastly embraced and expanded by the 
early republican elite circles in the formative period of modern 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Sociology, The TDV Center for Islamic Studies (ISAM), Istanbul, 
Turkey; former Research Fellow, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (CRER), University of 
Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom. An earlier version of this article was first presented at the 
Ninth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium: “New Impulses in the Interaction of 
Law and Religion,” J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, October 5–9, 
2002. The author would like to thank Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr., Professor Elizabeth A. 
Sewell, and the students of the J. Reuben Clark Law School for their assistance in preparing this 
article. 
 1. See ANDREW DAVISON, SECULARISM AND REVIVALISM IN TURKEY 87, 107 (1998); 
NIYAZI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 432, 437–38 (1998). See 
generally Enzo Pace, The Helmet and the Turban: Secularization in Islam, in SECULARIZATION 
AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 165, 168–70 (Rudi Laermans et al. eds., 1998). 
KUC-FIN 5/31/2003  1:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
476 
Turkey.2 Successor states inherited and adopted some of the ideas 
and practices of the old regime. However, even today, the Ottoman 
political culture and state traditions continue to influence politics, 
though in a modified form.3 
Nevertheless, modern Turkey continues to struggle to find an 
appropriate balance between religion and secularism in a nation that 
is almost entirely Muslim. Consequently, Turkey offers an excellent 
case study for those seeking answers to the following questions: Can 
Islam and democracy coexist? How far can religion and secularism be 
reconciled? To what extent can religious liberty, particularly freedom 
of religious expression, be extended in a secular state with a majority 
Muslim population? How does a Muslim majority address the 
problems of non-Muslim minorities? These and other similar 
questions should be answered within the context of the global spread 
of democracy and the rise of religion. 
This paper provides a context for addressing these questions by 
providing a historical overview of religion’s role in the public life of 
Turkey in Part II. Part III then looks at the role of religion in 
Turkey’s current political situation. Part IV concludes that while it is 
still progressing towards finding an ideal balance between religion 
and politics, Turkey shows how Islam and modern democracy can 
peacefully coexist. 
II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE’S LEGACY 
Because centuries of the Ottoman dynastic rule created a legacy 
that no successor regime could afford to disregard, a consideration of 
how modern ideas entered and shaped Turkish political culture 
during the Ottoman Empire is imperative to understanding the 
country’s current attempts to reconcile religion and secularism.4 This 
section will begin by discussing the political reforms that occurred 
during the Ottoman Empire. It then explains the millet system, the 
system of religious law that operated during that time. 
 
 2. See, e.g., TARIK Z. TUNAYA, TÜRKIYE BÜYÜK MILLET MECLISI HÜKÛMETININ 
KURULUSU VE SIYASÎ KARAKTERI 20–22 (1958), quoted in BERKES, supra note 1, at 438. 
 3. Ergun Özbudun, The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the 
Middle East, in IMPERIAL LEGACY: THE OTTOMAN IMPRINT ON THE BALKANS AND THE 
MIDDLE EAST 133 (L. Carl Brown ed., 1996) [hereinafter IMPERIAL LEGACY]. 
 4. FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY 15 (1993). For a detailed 
examination of the imperial legacy’s effect on the Turkish Republic, see MICHAEL E. MEEKER, A 
NATION OF EMPIRE: THE OTTOMAN LEGACY OF TURKISH MODERNITY 3–81, 372–96 (2002). 
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A. Modernity and Reforms 
The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state in which the head of 
the state served as a caliph who held both temporal and spiritual 
authority.5 The traditional political culture of the empire, as well as 
its administrative machinery, continued with little change as long as 
the state preserved its military might and economic power. However, 
beginning in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the 
Ottoman Empire entered a period of military and economic decline.6 
New ideas emerged regarding the necessity of reforms in political, 
economic, educational, and military fields.7 Consequently, Ottoman 
leaders found it necessary to introduce reforms into the empire’s 
political, economic, educational, and military structures.8 
The resulting modernization and secularization of the Ottoman 
Empire occurred in several phases that were ushered in by significant 
events. The earliest efforts at modernization and the incorporation of 
Western influences can be traced to the impact of the French 
Revolution in 1789. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the Ottoman State started losing control over the empire’s 
periphery. As the state lost wars, tax revenue declined. Eventually, 
the state fell into a fiscal crisis. 
Military defeats, loss of territory, and a weakening influence on 
international politics during the last two centuries were all significant 
reasons for instigating reforms. The first wave of reforms started 
under the reign of Selim III (1789–1807), who introduced the 
Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) in an attempt to strengthen the central 
state against internal and external threats.9 His rise to power 
coincided with the French Revolution, which was based on the idea 
of “liberty, equality and fraternity.” Selim III invited French experts 
and teachers to train a newly created military unit of 30,000 
individuals.10 The flow of Western ideas that began with the arrival of  
 
 5. For background information on the caliph’s role in ancient Turkey, see BERKES, 
supra note 1, at 9–10, 13–14. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 24, 30, 33–36, 42–45. 
 9. ERIK J. ZÜRCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 23–26 (1993); see also BERKES, 
supra note 1, at 72–81 (discussing reforms instituted during the New Order). 
 10. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 75. 
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the French trainers continued through Turkey’s decision to open 
permanent embassies in London, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris.11 
Selim III fell from power in 1807,12 and in 1826, after Mahmut 
II came to power, he carried the reforms forward.13 Mahmut II set 
the direction of later reforms in the Ottoman Empire and modern 
Turkey and succeeded in reducing the power of the traditional 
learned elite known as the Ulema.14 He also introduced secular 
education by establishing new schools such as the Army Medical 
School (1827), where medicine, biology, and physics induced 
rationalist and positivist thinking among its students.15 The opening 
of the School of Military Music (1831) and the Military Academy 
(1834) with foreign instructors,16 as well as the establishment of 
schools for ten to fifteen-year-old boys,17 followed as part of 
Muhmut’s reform project. 
After Mahmut II’s death in 1839, his successor, Sultan 
Abdulmejid, introduced a new era of reforms known as the 
Tanzimat.18 The Edict of the Rose Garden (Gülhane Hatt-i Serifi), 
declared in 1856, was central to Sultan Abdulmejid’s reforms.19 The 
edict transformed many common cultural practices by requiring 
reforms in the military, central bureaucracy, and judicial procedures20 
and by introducing secular education and secular laws to Turkish 
society. 21 Almost all of these modernizing reforms had some bearing 
 
 11. See DONALD QUATAERT, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1700–1922, at 79 (2000). 
 12. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
 13. See id. at 97–128 (describing Mahmut’s secularization of education); STANFORD J. 
SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY 
36–50 (1977) (discussing Mahmut’s policies and reforms); ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 33–35. 
 14. See Uriel Heyd, The Later Ottoman Empire in Rumelia and Anatolia, in 1 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM: THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC LANDS 354 (P.M. Holt et al. eds., 
1970) [hereinafter THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM]. 
 15. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 46. 
 16. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 111 (opening of Military Academy). 
 17. See id. at 106. 
 18. See ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 52–74; see also BERKES, supra note 1, at 155–88 
(following the historical progress of the Tanzimal). 
 19. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 152 (referring to the document as the Reform Edict 
(Islahat Fermanı)). The Gülhane Charter, another document prepared in 1839, “proclaimed 
the principles of the Tanzimat.” See id. at 145 (describing its contents). 
 20. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 61 (concluding that the edict formalized the 
state’s responsibility to offer protection of the laws, regardless of religion). 
 21. SELÇUK AKSIN SOMEL, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1839–1908, at 42–54 (2001). 
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on the relationship between state and religion, as they influenced the 
Islamic character of the state structure, the legal system, the 
educational establishments, and the political culture in Ottoman 
Turkey. 
The Ottoman legal system was based on the Sharia, the Islamic 
legal code. As an important part of the modernization and 
westernization process, the state introduced secular laws, although 
the fundamentals of the Sharia were protected and codified.22 This 
secularization began even before the establishment of the secular 
Turkish Republic. As part of these reforms, the state adopted the 
Commercial Code from France in 185023 and the Maritime 
Commerce Code in 1863.24 The government also created new 
secular courts called Nizamiye in 1869.25 Secularization also affected 
education. For example, professional teaching colleges for the army 
and the bureaucracy were opened for secular education. The School 
of Civil Service (Mekteb-i Mülkiye) was opened in 1859, and 
regulation of public education appeared in 1869.26 These reforms 
culminated in the adoption of the constitution in 1876 as a new step 
towards a more liberal regime.27 
While institutional reforms took place, cultural changes also 
began to take hold in society. Educated Turks began to wear new 
styles of clothing and the elite adopted foreign customs and 
languages. The period between 1913 and 1918 marked the last 
period of the Ottoman Empire. During that period, Seyhülislam was 
removed from the cabinet (1916), and the judicial system became 
more secularized through the subordination of Sharia courts to the 
secular Ministry of Justice in 1917.28 
 
 22. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 145–47 (describing how the Gülhane Charter severed the 
temporal and religious world from one another), 160–69 (describing secular lawmaking under 
the edict); see also id. at 132 (describing Mahmut II’s previous introduction of secular laws). 
 23. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 118–19. 
 24. See id. at 118. 
 25. See ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 64. 
 26. See SOMEL, supra note 21, at 50–52; ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 65; Carter Vaughan 
Findley, Knowledge and Education, in MODERNIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE AND ITS AFRO-ASIAN SUCCESSORS 127 (Cyril E. Black & L. Carl Brown eds., 1992). 
 27. Heyd, supra note 14, at 367. 
 28. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 169, 171–72. In Medieval times, the Seyhülislam was the 
highest ranking muftî, a graduate of a religious institution called a medrese who was appointed as 
a juristconsult. See id. at 15. Because of his high rank, “[h]is official statements related not only to 
matters of religious policy, but also [sic] such major concerns of the state as declarations of war, 
relations with non-Muslim states, taxation, and innovations . . . and the introduction of 
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Traditional institutions of learning (medrese) also came under the 
control of the Ministry of Education, which modernized the 
curriculum. A noticeable change regarding the status of woman also 
took place during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. As part 
of the empowerment movement, primary education for girls became 
compulsory in 1913, and some university courses were opened for 
women in 1914.29 
World War I marked the end of the Ottoman Empire. However, 
on October 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the 
Turkish Republic, proclaimed that there was “a sufficient social base 
for establishing a secular republic.”30 The establishment of modern 
Turkey opened a new chapter in history for all Turkish people, 
including non-Muslim minority communities. The Lausanne Treaty 
of July 24, 1923,31 which recognized the establishment of Turkey, 
had an important effect on the recognition, rights, and liberty of 
religious minority communities in modern Turkey.32 
To understand the changing conditions of non-Muslim 
minorities during Turkey’s transition from an Islamic empire to a 
secular nation state, a study of Turkey’s history will be essential. Such 
an analysis will help explain how a homogenizing nation-building 
process, which disregarded ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
differences, redefined the status of non-Muslims. 
B. Non-Muslims Under the Ottoman Rule:  
The Millet System as a Mechanism of Accommodation 
The Ottoman state defined its subjects according to their religious 
affiliation. This system of categorization, called the millet (nation) 
system defined each religious community as a separate nation.33 The 
Ottoman conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) in 1453, during the 
 
inventions.” Id. Notably, Mahmut II had previously recognized the Seyhülislam as a leader that 
stood “above all other temporal and religious officeholders in the traditional system,” and 
therefore had relegated his power to only religious affairs. See id. at 97–98. 
 29. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 126. 
 30. See AHMAD, supra note 4, at 8. 
 31. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, U.K.-Turk., arts. 38–40, reprinted in 2 THE 
TREATIES OF PEACE: 1919–1923, at 959, 971–72 (1924), available at http://www.lib. 
byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). 
 32. Today, the terms and conditions of the Lausanne Treaty are still valid. Therefore, 
problems facing religious minorities in Turkey are still subject to this treaty. 
 33. See BERKES, supra note 1, at 11–12. 
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early years of Mehmet II’s reign (1451–81), was a historical turning 
point in Turkish history. The conquest affected the Turkish presence in 
Europe and the consequent relations between the Turks and the 
Europeans. Mehmet II’s treatment of individuals in Istanbul at the 
time of its fall and his policy of reconstruction were historical examples 
of tolerance and acceptance of the “others” in terms of race, religion, 
language, and culture.34 
Arguably, Istanbul constituted an early model of a multi-racial and 
multi-cultural society where differences did not lead to conflict or 
repression. Mehmet II “sought to make his capital a microcosm of all 
the races and religious elements in the empire.”35 He issued imperial 
decrees to protect the lives and properties of Istanbul’s inhabitants, 
regardless of their racial, religious, cultural, or linguistic backgrounds. 
Mehmet II’s policy of accommodating various religious persuasions 
attracted many Muslims, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Slavs, and others to 
settle in Istanbul as early as 1452. “Istanbul became the centre of 
Muslim-Christian co-existence which lasted for over five hundred 
years.”36 
Ethnic and cultural diversity thrived under Ottoman rule by 
adopting a policy of recognition and toleration for other cultures. 
The Ottomans “became particularly tolerant and conciliatory 
toward Christians and Jews.”37 Maintenance and nourishment of 
ethnic diversity to promote a multi-racial society were not only 
encouraged, but such diversity was also protected by imperial 
decrees from within. The Ottoman bureaucracy succeeded in 
 
 34. See generally FRANZ BABINGER, MEHMED THE CONQUEROR AND HIS TIME 103–04, 
412 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1978). After the fall of Istanbul, resettlement measures were taken to 
replenish the population by bringing back former inhabitants and by newly settling others. For 
example, Greeks driven from Morea were placed in the Fener quarter, while many Jewish families 
were brought from Thessaloniki to restore the prosperity of the city. See id. at 103–04. Mehmed II 
undoubtedly had religious tolerance, as Isaac Sarfati wrote in letter in 1454 to the Jews of central 
Europe that the Ottoman Empire was a paradise for non-Muslim subjects, especially Jews. While 
the situation for Jews in the middle of the fifteenth century was particularly wretched and they were 
subjected to constant persecution because of their beliefs, in the Ottoman Empire no one was 
molested for his or her religious conviction. See id. at 412. 
 35. 1 STANFORD SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY 
59 (1977). 
 36. ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS, THE GREEK MINORITY OF ISTANBUL AND GREEK-TURKISH 
RELATIONS 1918–1974, at 21 (1983). 
 37. Halil Inalcik, The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case, in IMPERIAL LEGACY, 
supra note 3, at 17, 24. 
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dealing with ethnic groups by devising an administrative system that 
would allow and preserve ethnic diversity. 
It is noteworthy to make a brief analysis of the rationale behind the 
millet system and how it operated. Such an analysis proves relevant to 
contemporary debates on ethnic and religious minority groups in 
multi-racial and multi-religious societies. However, given the millet 
system’s religious based divisions, its value should be judged by 
fourteenth and fifteenth century standards rather than modern 
standards of liberty and egalitarianism.38 
As noted earlier, Mehmet II adopted an original policy 
designed to establish a heterogeneous but harmonious society in 
Istanbul. The millet system had a “socio-cultural and communal 
framework based, firstly, on religion, and, secondly, on ethnicity.”39 
This framework in turn reflected the linguistic differences of the 
millets.40 The millet system was divided into communities 
according to religious affiliation. Each religious community formed 
a “millet” and the collection of millets formed the millet system.41 
“Each millet established and maintained its own institutions to care 
for the functions not carried out by the Ruling Class.” 42 Individual 
millets governed institutions such as “education, religion, justice, 
and social security.”43 Many currently existing schools, hospitals, 
hotels, and hospices for the poor and the aged have their origins in 
the individual millets.44 
The millet system has been an important administrative apparatus 
to nurture and sustain the multicultural and multi-religious nature of 
society throughout Ottoman history. As a well-known historian 
points out 
 The millet system emerged gradually as an answer to the efforts 
of the Ottoman administration to take into account the 
 
 38. For recent debates on religious minorities, see Jorgen Nielsen, Contemporary 
Discussions on Religious Minorities in Islam, 2002 BYU L. REV. 353. 
 39. Kemal H. Karpat, Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and 
State in the Post-Ottoman Era, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE 
FUNCTIONING OF A PLURAL SOCIETY141, 141 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982) 
[hereinafter CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE]. 
 40. See id. at 141–42. 
 41. 1 SHAW, supra note 35, at 151. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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organization and culture of the various religious-ethnic groups it 
ruled. The system provided, on the one hand, a degree of religious, 
cultural, and ethnic continuity within these communities, while on 
the other it permitted their incorporation into the Ottoman 
administrative, economic and political system.45 
Under the millet system “[e]ach religious community maintained 
its own courts, judges, and legal principles for the use of 
coreligionists.”46 
The millet system allowed minority subjects to develop and 
maintain their ethnic identity. Greek Orthodox Christians became 
the first major millet, and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was 
recognized within the millet system.47 The patriarch could apply 
Orthodox law in secular and religious matters to the followers of the 
Orthodox Church in Istanbul.48 
Similarly, the millet system allowed the Jews to form their own 
ethnic community and to establish independent religious 
institutions in Istanbul.49 The autonomy available to minorities 
under the Ottoman Empire attracted large numbers of displaced 
Jewish communities who were among the victims of persecution in 
Spain, Poland, Austria, and Bohemia.50 While in Jewish 
communities located in Russia, Romania, and most of the Balkan 
states suffered from constant persecution because of pogroms, anti-
Jewish laws, and other vexations, Jewish communities established in 
Turkish territory enjoyed an altogether remarkable atmosphere of 
tolerance and justice.51 Along with the Greek Orthodox and Jewish 
 
 45. Karpat, supra note 39, at 141–42. 
 46. QUATAERT, supra note 11, at 175. For the legal status of non-Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire, see M. Macit Kenanoglu, Osmanli Devletinde Millet Sistemi ve 
Gayrimulimlerin Hukuki Statuleri 1453–1856 [Millet System and the Legal Status of Non-
Muslims in the Ottoman State] (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Marmara University) 
(on file with author). 
 47. 1 SHAW, supra note 35, at 151. 
 48. Id. at 152. 
 49. See ARYEH SHMUELEVITZ, THE JEWS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE LATE 
FIFTEENTH AND THE SIXTEENTH CENTURIES: ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND 
SOCIAL RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE RESPONSA 14–19 (1984) (discussing Jewish 
autonomy within the Ottoman Empire); see also STANFORD J. SHAW, THE JEWS OF THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 37–97 (1991). 
 50. See generally SHAW, supra note 49, at 1–36; Avigdor Levy, Introduction to id., at 1–21. 
 51. Paul Dumont, Jewish Communities in Turkey During the Last Decades of the Nineteenth 
Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS 
IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, supra note 39, at 221,  221–22. 
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communities, the Armenians also gained millet status.52 This 
achievement in turn led to the recognition of the Armenian 
patriarch as a leader over his followers. Such status paralleled that 
given to the Greek patriarch and the Grand Rabbi. 
The development and practice of a tolerant administrative 
system under the Ottoman Empire made the coexistence of 
different religious, racial, and ethnic communities possible. This 
system was widely accepted by the Balkan nations, and it remained 
in practice until the nineteenth century when, under nationalistic 
fervor, the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks began to revolt with a 
view to establish their own respective states.53 Here one can ask the 
following question: How were Muslim Ottoman subjects treated in 
comparison to non-Muslims? In response to this question, the 
1893 testimony of the Jewish community in Ottoman Salonica is 
an interesting example: 
There are but few countries, even among those which are 
considered the most enlightened and the most civilized, where 
Jews enjoy a more complete equality than in Turkey [the 
Ottoman empire]. H. M. the sultan and the government of the 
Porte display towards Jews a spirit of largest toleration and 
liberalism.54 
According to one scholar, “this statement likely represents the 
sentiments of large numbers of Ottoman non-Muslim subjects, 
Christian and Jewish alike during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.”55 Nevertheless, the rise of nationalism among both 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in the nineteenth century led to 





 52. VARTAN ARTINIAN, THE ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IN THE OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE, 1839–1863, at 15–18 (1988); Kevork B. Bardakjian, The Rise of the Armenian 
Patriarchate of Constantinople, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, supra 
note 39, at 89, 89–100. 
 53. Halil Inalcik, The Turks and the Balkans, 1993 TURKISH REV. OF BALKAN STUD. 9. 
 54. QUATAERT, supra note 11, at 177 (quoting Dumont, supra note 51, at 221). The 
Jewish community opened its first school in 1867, and within a few decades, its number of 
schools reached more than fifty. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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conflicts.56 These movements led to the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
III. MODERN TURKEY 
The establishment of a modern nation-state in Turkey 
crystallized the ideological orientation of the republican elite aimed 
at reshaping the state and its institutions on the basis of a secular 
model inspired by the West.57 Political, social, and religious 
developments in modern Turkey were influenced by the ideals of 
modernism and secularism.58 Since its foundation, “Turkey’s 
political elites voluntarily attempted the most radical secularization 
among the Muslim countries. The principle of democracy was 
secondary to that of state secularism.”59 This section will begin by 
providing a brief overview of the modern process of secularization 
in Turkey. It will then consider the continued influence of religion 
in politics, in particular the influence of Islam in numerous political 
parties. 
A. Modern Secularism 
Inspired by the principles of modernization, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, the first president of modern Turkey, introduced sweeping 
changes in Turkish society. Atatürk’s main aim in the process of 
modernization during the early years of the Turkish Republic was 
to change the basic structure of Turkish society60 and to redefine 
the political community. He tried to remove society from an 
Islamic framework and introduce society to a sense of belonging to 
a newly defined “Turkish nation.”61 To achieve this goal, Atatürk 
 
 56. See generally Fatma Müge Göçek, The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms, in SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (Fatma Müge Göçek ed., 2002); Sükrü Hanioglu, 
Turkish Nationalism and the Young Turks, 1889–1908, in SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra, at 85. 
 57. Kemal H. Karpat, Modern Turkey, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM, supra 
note 14, at  527, 553. 
 58. DOUGLAS A. HOWARD, THE HISTORY OF TURKEY 96–106 (2001). 
 59. Nilüfer Göle, Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey, in 
2 CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 17, 19 (Augustus Richards Norton ed., 1996). 
 60. BINNAZ TOPRAK, ISLAM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY 39 (1981). 
 61. S.N. Eisenstadt, The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and 
Analytical Remarks, in ATATÜRK AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY 3, 9 (Jacob M. 
Landau ed., 1984). 
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launched a movement of cultural westernization to provide the 
Turkish nation with a new worldview that would replace its 
religious worldview and culture.62 Atatürk viewed the separation of 
religion and politics as a prerequisite to opening the doors to 
Western values.63 Therefore, secularism became one of the central 
tenets of Atatürk’s program to accomplish modernization.64 
As a part of this secularization policy, Atatürk launched a major 
campaign against the Islamic institutional and cultural basis of 
society. This attempt to disestablish Islam as the state religion would 
prepare the climate for the introduction of secularism in the Turkish 
Constitution65 during the single-party period of the Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) (“RPP”).66 Secularization 
reforms, which were undertaken during the first decade of the new 
republic, founded in 1923, aimed at minimizing the role of religion 
in every walk of Turkish society. The motive behind the 
secularization program was to reduce the societal significance of 
religious values and to eventually disestablish cultural and political 
institutions stamped by Islam.67 
This program was implemented through a well-planned policy 
comprised of three phases. These phases were (1) symbolic 
secularization, (2) institutional secularization, and (3) functional 
secularization. Symbolic secularization enforced changes in various 
aspects of national culture or societal life that had a symbolic 
identification with Islam by transforming the perception of Islamic 
symbols from sacred to profane.68 The most significant 
secularization reform in this sphere, the changing of the alphabet 
 
 62. Serif Mardin, Religion and Secularism in Turkey, in ATATÜRK: FOUNDER OF A 
MODERN STATE 191, 212 (Ali Kazancigil & Ergun Özbudun eds., 1981). 
 63. See, e.g., BERKES, supra note 1, at 443–46 (describing Atatürk’s program of 
nationalism). 
 64. WALTER F. WEIKER, THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY: FROM ATATÜRK TO THE 
PRESENT DAY 105 (1981); Sabri M. Akural, Kemalist Views on Social Change, in ATATÜRK 
AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 61, at 125–26. 
 65. Ilter Turan, Religion and Political Culture in Turkey, in ISLAM IN MODERN 
TURKEY: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE IN A SECULAR STATE 31, 34 (Richard Tapper 
ed., 1991) [hereinafter ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY]. 
 66. Turkey was originally established as a single party state and the multi-party 
democratic system was introduced later. 
 67. Serif Mardin, Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey, in ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 142 (James P. Piscatori ed., 1983). 
 68. TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 40–41. 
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from Arabic to Latin script, took place in 1928.69 Because the new 
regime regarded language as a connection with history, culture, and 
sacred scripture, changing the alphabet was an “effective step 
towards breaking old religious traditions” and weakening the link 
with the past.70 Additionally, the acceptance of the Western hat and 
Western styles of clothing, the adoption of the Gregorian 
calendar,71 the introduction of Western music in schools, and the 
change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday72 facilitated 
symbolic secularization in Turkey. 
Institutional secularization, on the other hand, aimed at reducing 
the institutional strength of Islam and its influence on the political 
affairs of the country.73 The basic goal of the Kemalist elite was “to 
completely free the polity from religious considerations. Islam was 
not supposed to have even the function of a ‘civil religion’ for the 
Turkish polity; Islam was not going to provide a transcendent goal 
for the political life.”74 
Thus, the first step of institutional secularization was abolishing 
the caliphate on March 3, 1924.75 In the same year, the state also 
abolished the office of Seyhülislam,76 and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Pious Foundations took its place.77 Thereafter, the state 
transformed the Ümmet (or Umma, the “Community of Believers”) 
into a secular national entity in order to eradicate religion as a 
common bond of solidarity. Finally, the Sufi movements 
(Tarikatlar/Tasavvufi hareketler)78 and their activities were outlawed 
in 1925. The Tekkes and Zaviyes of widespread Sufi movements such 
 
 69. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 277 (2d ed. 1968); 
G.L. Lewis, Atatürk’s Language Reform as an Aspect of Modernization in the Republic of 
Turkey, in ATATÜRK AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 61, at 195 
(supporting the alphabet reform); Karpat, supra note 57, at 535. 
 70. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 386. 
 71. Both of these events took place in 1925. See DAVISON, supra note 1, at 150. 
 72. Both of these events took place in 1935. See generally TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 45; 
Akural, supra note 64, at 37. 
 73. TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 46. 
 74. Metin Heper, Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 35 
MIDDLE E. J. 345, 350 (1981). 
 75. See Karpat, supra note 57, at 533. 
 76. For further information on this office, see ESAD EFENDI (Seyhülislam), available 
at http://www.osmanli700.gen.tr/kisiler/e5.html (Turkish) (last visited February 15, 2003). 
 77. See generally SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 384. 
 78. The Sufi Brotherhoods is one school of law in the Islamic religion. 
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as the Mawlawi, the Bektashi, the Nakshbandi,79 and the Qadiri80 
were closed.81 With the abolition of the caliphate and other religious 
institutions, the principles of political legitimacy were changed to 
replace Islam with loyalty to the state as the source of political 
legitimacy.82 
Functional secularization was the third phase of the 
secularization program in Turkey; it involved two stages: legal and 
educational.83 Legal secularization was designed to firmly establish 
modernization reform in Turkish society. Secularization of the court 
system through the adoption of Western codes was the first step 
because the Sharia Law was regarded as an obstacle to the 
westernization program.84 By eliminating the Sharia Law, which 
governed the personal affairs of the Islamic community,85 the pro-
westernization elite could reduce the functional influence of Islam in 
the community. 
The second stage of functional secularization was implemented 
in the educational system to establish a program of functional 
differentiation of institutions.86 Under the Law for the Unification 
of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat), enacted in 1924, all educational 
establishments came under the strict control of the state.87 Finally, 
 
 79. For an analysis of this order, see Serif Mardin, The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey, in 
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND MILITANCE 
204 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993). See also Serif Mardin, The Naksibendi 
Order in Turkish History, in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, supra note 65, at 121; Hakan Yavuz, 
The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order, in THE 
NAQSHBANDIS IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL ASIA 129–57 (Elisabeth Özdalga ed., 1999). 
 80. For the current influence of this order, see Sencer Ayata, Traditional Sufi Orders on 
the Periphery: Kadiri and Naksibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon, in ISLAM IN MODERN 
TURKEY, supra note 65, at 223. 
 81. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 384. 
 82. Nevertheless, despite the abolition of the caliphate, the Constitution of April 20, 
1924, preserved Islam as the state religion. See id. at 534. 
 83. TOPRAK, supra note 60, at 48. 
 84. Legal secularization was accomplished by the adoption of a new civil code based on 
a Swiss cantonal code in 1926 as a replacement of Sharia law. See 2 SHAW & SHAW, supra note 
13, at 385. 
 85. Sharia Law covered such issues as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. 
 86. This differentiation primarily involved the medreses, Islamic theological schools. See 
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HISTORY OF TURKS AND TURKEY, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cab/ (last visited February 15, 2003). 
 87. Michael Winter, The Modernization of Education in Kemalist Turkey, in ATATÜRK 
AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY, supra note 61, at 183, 185–86; BERKES, supra note 
1, at 477. 
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Atatürk’s successors during the one-party period of Turkey’s early 
history also implemented reforms that “introduced a certain  
mobility into political, institutional and cultural life, but [they 
came] at the cost of a serious break with Islamic heritage.”88 
Despite the secularization efforts and the restrictions on 
religious practices, Islam has remained one of the major identity 
references in Turkey and it continues to be an effective social 
reality, shaping the fabric of Turkish society. The equation between 
being Turkish and being Muslim is a hallmark of Turkish identity. 
As Bernard Lewis points out, despite the striking changes that 
Turkish society has faced, the Islamic imprint still remains alive: 
Islam has profound roots among the Turkish people. From its 
foundation until its fall the Ottoman Empire was a state dedicated 
to the advancement or defence of the power and faith of Islam. 
Turkish thought, life, and letters were permeated through and 
through by the inherited traditions of the classical Muslim cultures, 
which, though transmuted into something new and distinctive, 
remained basically and unshakeably Islamic.  
 After a century of Westernization, Turkey has undergone 
immense changes—greater than any outside observer had thought 
possible. But the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture 
are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in 
Turkey is still unchallenged.89 
Ninety-nine percent of Turks are Muslims, and to varying 
degrees, they practice the prescribed rituals such as daily prayers and 
fasting in Ramazan (the month of fasting). Additionally, Islamic 
moral values are vigorously upheld within the patriarchal structures 
of traditional Turkish families.90 In sum, Islamic values are deeply 
rooted in Turkish society.91 
 
 88. Mohammed Arkoun, Positivism and Tradition in an Islamic Perspective: Kemalism, 
DIOGENES, No. 127, at 97 (1984). 
 89. LEWIS, supra note 69, at 424. 
 90. JENNY B. WHITE, MONEY MAKES US RELATIVES: WOMEN’S LABOR IN URBAN 
TURKEY 37 (1994). 
 91. For a discussion of common and widespread religious practices, see ILDIKÓ BELLER-
HANN & CHRIS HANN, TURKISH REGION: STATE, MARKET & SOCIAL IDENTITIES ON THE 
EAST BLOCK SEA COAST 159–93 (2000); ADIL ÖZDEMIR & KENNETH FRANK, VISIBLE ISLAM 
IN MODERN TURKEY 78–169 (2000). 
KUC-FIN 5/31/2003  1:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
490 
B. Religion and Politics 
Turkey’s transition to multi-party politics in the late 1940s92 
marked a turning point in relaxing the official attitude towards 
religion, thus ending the era of radical secularism set forth by the 
RPP that was originally in power.93 This section will provide an 
overview of how Islam has returned to the public sphere through the 
mechanism of political parties. 
1. The Democratic Party 
In 1950, the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) (“DP”) won 
the first election after the transition to the multi-party system, 
ousting the RPP.94 While some scholars suggest that the “autocratic 
rule” of the RPP during the single-party period contributed to the 
emergence of an opposition that favored further democratization and 
liberalization,95 others attribute the DP’s election victory to the 
tolerant attitude of the party officials towards religion and to the 
party’s response to the pragmatic needs of the population, including 
its religious needs.96 In any event, this event underlined the centrality 
of Islam in Turkish society and its potential force in shaping the 
political behavior of the community. 
In that first multi-party general election, religious groups 
sought to influence parties by giving them support.97 The influence 
of religious groups that supported the DP was seen shortly after the 
DP’s election into power, and religion resurfaced more openly in 
social life.98 For example, the DP government extended religious 
education to all schools with the possibility of opting out if parents 
 
 92. See generally KEMAL H. KARPAT, TURKEY’S POLITICS: THE TRANSITION TO A 
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM (1959). 
 93. See Feroz Ahmad, Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey, 27 MIDDLE E. STUD. 3 
(1991). 
 94. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 119. 
 95. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 402. 
 96. Turan, supra note 65, at 45. 
 97. Of these, a well-known example of an alliance between the political leadership and a 
religious group is the Nurcu movement and its support of the DP in the interest of Islam. See 
Jacob M. Landau, Islamism and Secularism: The Turkish Case, in STUDIES IN JUDAISM AND 
ISLAM 361, 374–75 (Shelomo Morag et al. eds., 1981); AHMAD, supra note 4, at 11. See 
generally SERIF MARDIN, RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN TURKEY: THE CASE 
OF BEDIÜZZAMAN SAID NURSI (1989). 
 98. Saban Sitembölübasi, Aspects of Islamic Revival in Turkey: 1950–1960 (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester) (on file with author). 
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so wished.99 The government also established seven imam-hatip 
schools in 1951 to educate religious functionaries.100 The DP 
government allowed religion to enter society on other fronts as 
well. For example, the government replaced the Turkish language 
with Arabic in the call to prayer101 and allowed religious magazines 
and journals to appear in the public domain. 
Nevertheless, although political ideologies inspired by the 
religiously oriented worldview began to enter the public domain 
towards the end of the 1960s, such an accommodation of 
religiously-based political ideologies was against the ideals of 
modernization and secularization. Consequently, the tension and 
controversy over the expression of Islam through a political front 
grew.102 
2. The National Order, National Salvation, and Motherland Parties 
The role of Islam in political parties continued to be an area of 
particular concern. In 1970, Necmettin Erbakan founded the Milli 
Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) (“NOP”), but the 
Constitutional Court banned it in 1971 following a military 
ultimatum.103 The court found that the party’s use of religion for 
political purposes violated Turkey’s fundamental constitutional 
provisions requiring secularism.104 
 
 99. HALIS AYHAN, TÜRKIYE’DE DIN EGITIMI, 1920–1998 [RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN 
TURKEY, 1920–1998] 125–35 (1999). 
 100. By 1958, their number had increased to eighteen. See Bahattin Aksit, Islamic 
Education in Turkey: Medrese Reform in Late Ottoman Times and Imam-Hatip Schools in the 
Republic, in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, supra note 65, at 145, 146–47; see also Elizabeth 
Özdalga, Education in the Name of “Order and Progress”: Reflections on the Recent Eight Year 
Obligatory School Reform in Turkey, 89 THE MUSLIM WORLD 414 (1999) (analyzing the 
development of Turkish education). In 1997, compulsory education was extended to eight 
years, see Haldun Gülalp, The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode, NEW 
PERSP. ON TURK., Fall 1999, at 35, 52, which led to the closure of nearly all the middle level 
imam-hatip schools. See SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 409. 
 101. SHAW & SHAW, supra note 13, at 409. 
 102. For a sociological analysis, see Nuri Tinaz, Religion, Politics, Social and Intellectual 
Change in Modern Turkey, 14 HAMDARD ISLAMICUS 67 (1991). 
 103. See Niyazi Öktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 395–96. 
 104. Mustafa Erdogan, Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey’s Quest for Democracy Without 
Islam, CRITIQUE, Fall 1999, at 25, 36. 
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Thereafter Erbakan established a new party, the Milli Selamet 
Partisi (National Salvation Party)105 (“NSP”), which held the same 
political ideology as the former NOP.106 After the 1973 general 
elections, the NSP played a key role as a coalition partner since 
neither the right-wing party nor the left-wing party had a sufficient 
majority to establish the government alone. Nevertheless, after its 
brief success, the NSP was once again dissolved, this time by the 
military regime that came to power in 1980.107 
The NSP’s contribution to Turkey’s political development 
ranged from instilling ideological principles in society, to the 
implementation of its policies as a coalition partner in the 
government. Its political stand, named National Vision (Milli 
Görüs), was rooted in the traditional, religious, and moral values of 
Turkish society.108 One of the party’s principle tenets was opposition 
to the dissemination of Western materialist ideas, which the party 
thought would shake the fabric of society in terms of the religious, 
moral, and family life of the nation.109 
The military intervention on September 12, 1980, suspended 
Turkey’s fragile democracy and caused a breakdown in party 
politics by banning all political parties and sending their leaders to 
trial.110 The first election after the military coup in 1983 was a 
turning point in Turkish political history, and the election results 
and subsequent government policies under Turgut Özal’s 
premiership changed the course of Turkish political culture for 
 
 105. On the development and role of the NSP in Turkish politics, see ALI YASAR 
SARIBAY, TÜRKIYE’DE MODERNLESME, DIN VE PARTI POLITIKASI: MSP ORNEK OLAYI 
[MODERNIZATION, RELIGION AND PARTY POLITICS IN TURKEY: A CASE STUDY OF THE NSP] 
(1985); TOPRAK, supra note 60; Jacob M. Landau, The National Salvation Party in Turkey, 11 
ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 1 (1976); Ergun Özbudun, Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The 
Case of the National Salvation Party, in THE ISLAMIC IMPULSE 142 (Barbara Freyer Stowasser 
ed., 1987). 
 106. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 272. 
 107. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 158. All political activities of the NSP, along with those 
of other parties, were outlawed. The NSP leaders were banned from involvement in politics. 
 108. See generally MARVINE HOWE, TURKEY TODAY: A NATION DIVIDED OVER ISLAM’S 
REVIVAL 24–26 (2000). 
 109. See id. 
 110. AHMAD, supra note 4, at 181–89; HOWARD, supra note 58, at 156–65. Ironically, 
although the military was known for their staunch secularity, the generals who had instigated 
the coup decided to make religious education compulsory in primary and secondary education. 
For the nature of religious education in Turkey, see Ali Murat Yel & Omer Faruk Harman, The 
Science of Religions in Turkish History, in MODERN 245, 245–57 (J.G. Platvoet & G.A. 
Wiegers eds., 2002). 
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decades to come. Turgut Özal’s center-right, liberal-conservative111 
Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) launched a liberalization and 
democratization policy in Turkey,112 which facilitated the 
expression of Islam in the public sphere to a greater degree than 
before. As part of its policy, the government deleted articles 141, 
142, and 163 of the constitution113 to lift obstacles to freedom of 
thought. The Motherland Party also adopted a free market 
economy through a large-scale privatization movement. 
3. The Welfare Party 
As soon as the referendum lifted the political ban imposed by the 
military regime in 1980, Necmettin Erbakan returned to politics 
with the same political discourse but under a new party name, the 
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) (“WP”).114 The WP had a modest start 
in 1984, and its vote share gradually increased, reaching nineteen 
percent in the 1994 local elections.115 This victory gave the WP 
control over Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara, as well 
as party control over many other provincial centers.116 
The general elections on December 24, 1995, were a turning 
point in Turkey’s modern political history. The elections resulted 
in the reconfiguration of religion and politics in the public sphere. 
The political developments soon after the elections,117 as well as 
the efforts of the WP to form a government, preoccupied the 
Turkish citizens regardless of their political preference or their 
degree of religiosity. The victory by the WP marked the first time 
since the foundation of the Turkish Republic that an Islamist party 
had claimed a majority. The rise of the WP meant that the political 
 
 111. While Turgut Özal had a liberal economic policy, he was conservative in traditional 
social values. 
 112. For an analysis of the Motherland Party and its reform policies, see HOWARD, supra 
note 58, at 165–71; ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 298; Üstün Ergüder, The Motherland Party, 
1983–1989, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 152, 153–69 (Metin Heper 
& Jacob M. Landau eds., 1991). 
 113. ZÜRCHER, supra note 9, at 305. 
 114. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 26. 
 115. See id. at 27. 
 116. ERGUN ÖZBUDUN, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 87 (2000). 
 117. See generally M. Hakan Yavuz, Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in 
Turkey, COMP. POL., Oct. 1997, at 63 (analyzing governmental policy’s effect on the Islamic 
political identity). 
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rhetoric of an Islamic-oriented party received large popular 
support. 
 
TABLE 1: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND THE RISE OF THE  
















19.1 27.0 19.1 12.01 
Motherland 
Party 
36.3 24.0 19.6 13.22 
Democratic 
Left Party 
8.5 10.8 14.6 22.19 
S .D. P. P. 24.8 20.8 - - 
Republican 
People’s Party 
- - 10.7 - 
Nationalist 
Action Party 
- - - 17.98 
 
Table 1 shows that the WP steadily increased its votes during the 
last three general elections. Since there was a national threshold of 
ten percent in the 1987 elections, the WP could not win any seats 
despite its 7.2% share in the results. In order to avoid such a result in 
the 1991 elections, the WP leadership negotiated with the Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) (“NAP”), which also 
sought an electoral partner to beat the ten percent threshold.119 As 
soon as the elections were over, the electoral coalition, which had 
allowed both parties to enter parliament, ceased and the WP 
assumed its own particular stance in Turkish politics. 
The WP had 21.3% of the votes and 168 seats in the 1995 
elections.120 After an initial failure to form a coalition government, 
 
 118. Statistics obtained from the Higher Electoral Board of Turkey. 
 119. This was only an electoral coalition, not a coalition to form a government. In order 
to overcome the ten percent electoral threshold, WP and NAP decided to enter the elections 
with a single ballot. 
 120. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 118. 
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the WP eventually succeeded in becoming an important government 
partner in June 1996, following the fall of the Motherland Party 
(“MP”)–True Path Party (“TPP”) (Dogru Yol Partisi) coalition.121 
As an Islamist politician, Necmettin Erbakan became the new Prime 
Minister of Turkey.122 
The WP’s achievement resulted from its integration into the 
political culture of Turkey and its respect for Turkey’s republican 
principle and legal system as well as its advocacy of the market 
economy.123 Although factors such as these may have been 
marginally significant, the true force behind the WP’s rise to power 
was its Islamist views.124 The Islamic revival or “return of Islam” is 
a much more complex phenomenon that involved social, economic, 
and political developments, both past and present. Because Islamic 
movements and Muslim politics do not have a monolithic nature, 
the Islamic revival should be viewed within the context of a current 
global revival of religion, which has not been limited to the Muslim 
world.125 
 
 121. See id. at 118–19. 
 122. See id. at 119. 
 123. See Eric Rouleau, Turkey: Beyond Atatürk, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1996, at 70, 
76–77. 
 124. For instance, the party used religious symbols and language as well as anti-
Western discourse. It also made promises to solve problems such as the headscarf ban at the 
universities. 
 125. It is worth noting here that the concepts referred to as revivalist Islam, resurgent 
Islam, and fundamentalist Islam drew the attention of politicians, journalists, and scholars to 
the global phenomenon of rising Islamic awareness. A plethora of semi-scholarly and scholarly 
literature examined different aspects of Islamic revivalism and movements of return to religious 
values. Especially after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, numerous publications appeared with 
differing approaches to understanding and explaining the nature of Islamic resurgence in 
Muslim societies. See generally Talip Kucukcan, The Nature of Islamic Resurgence in Near and 
Middle Eastern Muslim Societies, in 14 HAMDARD ISLAMICUS, supra note 102, at 71–74. 
Along with many other Muslim societies, Turkey also witnessed the revival of religious values 
among different segments of the society. 
The westernized elite in Muslim countries seem to have failed to establish a viable 
economic and political system during their long stay in power after the establishment of 
independent nation-states. Moreover, they did not succeed in providing workable solutions 
to the problems prevalent in Muslim societies such as poverty, unemployment, inadequate 
education, and unequal political participation. In the grip of these unresolved problems, 
Muslim intellectuals began to question the value and viability of the regimes in their 
countries. 
Islamic movements appealed to a large segment of society because they suggested that 
the Western-inspired regimes had all failed to produce and sustain an acceptable process of 
development. Muslim intellectuals also promoted the idea of seeking alternative sources of 
development and progress in the social, economic, and political reconstruction of Muslim 
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After the establishment of a coalition government with the 
center-right TPP, the secularist-Islamist divide in the political 
spectrum became more visible to the public. This was due in part to 
the lack of trust between the two camps. Although Erbakan changed 
some of his hostile discourses towards the West and Israel, he failed 
to convince the secular elite, the military, and many of the secular 
civil societies in Turkey of the virtues of his policy disfavoring the 
secular state. His foreign policy preferences were also a source of 
discontent among the secular elite in Turkey.126 Erbakan’s first visit 
was to Libya and his second was to Iran, followed by visits to 
 
societies. This meant a return to the Islamic idioms and root-paradigms and to the rediscovery 
of Islamic ideology as a world-view rooted in Qur’anic paradigms. 
The revival of Islam in Turkey gathered momentum after the 1980s. As mentioned 
earlier, Islamic values are deeply rooted in Turkish society and despite the striking socio-
political changes resulting from modernization and secularization, the Islamic imprint on 
the fabric of society still remains alive. Some scholars attribute the revival of Islamic values 
to the failure of the secular elite’s effort to replace religion with totally modern secular 
values. They suggest that secularization and westernization could not perform the 
metaphysical function of a religion. New reforms from the top could not provide a system of 
beliefs and practices that would enable people to overcome the ultimate problems of life. 
Heper, supra note 74, at 361. The early republican elite’s ideology seemed to have some 
shortcomings in its approach to religion. It failed to realize how deeply realism was rooted 
in Turkish society and it attempted to undermine the role of Islam for Turks in building a 
national identity. Mardin, supra note 67, at 229–30. The radical secular culture attempted 
to change the country’s habits, cultural values, and language. Yet these changes failed 
because they left gaping holes in the areas of habits and culture and “provided no equivalent 
for the widely used Islamic idiom.” Serif Mardin, Islam in Mass Society: Harmony Versus 
Polarization, in POLITICS IN THE THIRD TURKISH REPUBLIC 161, 164 (Metin Heper & 
Ahmet Evin eds., 1994). 
To this day, Atatürk’s intention to make religion purely a private concern in an 
individual’s life has not materialized because the boundaries of private daily life have assumed a 
wider role in Turkish society. While private daily life increasingly gained new variety and 
richness, religion acquired a more effective role and a central focus in society. Private religious 
education, the development of Islamic fashion and dress, the production of religious music, 
and the publication of Islamic journals as aspects of the privatization wave made Islam more 
pervasive in modern Turkish society. 
The spread of universal education in Turkey and the rapid developments in 
communication technology transformed the message of the Sufi Orders into mass religious 
movements. These movements can be described as faith movements, having new distinctive 
characteristics. These developments have resisted the forces that attempted to make religion 
a private matter. Social changes such as migration from rural to urban settlement areas, 
rapid demographic change, multi-party politics, and economic and industrial developments 
have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey. See Naci Sevkal, An Overview of Turkey’s 
Urbanization, in TURKEY SINCE 1970: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 77–78 
(Debbie Lovatt ed., 2001). 
 126. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 157–58. 
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Indonesia and Malaysia.127 These visits were interpreted as a 
departure from the modern world.128 In domestic politics, Erbakan’s  
somewhat inciting speeches and practices as head of the government 
made him highly unpopular with the armed forces.129 
On February 28, 1997, Turkey’s National Security Council 
“recommended” to Erbakan in ultimatum form a number of stern 
measures to guard the secular nature of the state, which Erbakan 
eventually signed after several days’ resistance.130 Erbakan’s own 
political downfall began with his resignation from office in June 
1997.131 The Turkish Constitutional Court abolished the Welfare 
Party in January 1998, again finding constitutional violations of 
secularism.132 The court also banned Erbakan and five other party 
leaders from political activity for five years.133 
4. The Virtue Party 
After the dissolution of the WP, the ex-members of the outlawed 
party formed a new group called the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) 
(“VP”).134 This party adhered to a political ideology identical to that 
of the WP. However, on March 22, 1999, the Attorney General filed 
an indictment for the ban of the VP, claiming that it supported anti-
secular opinions and represented the ideologies of a banned party.135 
Despite this reaction to the rise of the VP, none of the long-running 
problems regarding religious liberty came to an end during the 
party’s existence or during the coalition government’s term in office 
after the 1999 elections. 
 
 127. See generally id. 
 128. See, e.g., Turkish Press Scanner: “Supporter of Terrorism,” TURKISH DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 17, 1999), available at 1999 WL 5566304. 
 129. Öktem, supra note 103, at 398–99. 
 130. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 139. For a critique of the February 28 process, see 
M. Hakan Yavuz, Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere, 54 J. INT’L AFF. 21, 37–42 (2000). 
 131. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 179. This resignation occurred under pressure from the 
armed forces. See Haldun Gülalp, Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s 
Welfare Party, 33 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 433, 433 (2001) (discussing the Welfare Party’s 
contribution to the Islamic political identity). 
 132. The court based its ruling on articles 68 and 69 of the constitution and sections 
101(b) and 103(b) of Law number 2820 on the Regulation of Political Parties. 
 133. Öktem, supra note 103, at 396. 
 134. Army Chides Kutan Remarks, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1998, available at 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/12_01_98/dom.htm#d2. 
 135. Öktem, supra note 103, at 396–97. 
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Although the VP remained out of government office, the court 
case and debates about the party ideology continued, as did its 
appeal to the masses through a discreetly religious rhetoric. 
Through these discussions, the public sphere became more 
exclusive of religion in general and the expression of Islam in 
particular. 
The first parliamentary session after the 1999 elections was a test 
case for Turkish democracy because it set the limits of presence and 
expression of religious identity in the public sphere. The public 
sphere is still under the control of state ideology, rather than being 
an open domain for discussion regarding legitimacy and resources on 
the basis of mutual respect and understanding. As noted by one 
scholar 
 In the Turkish context . . . the public sphere is institutionalized 
and imagined as a site for the implementation of a secular and 
progressive way of life. An authoritarian modernism—rather than 
bourgeois, individualist liberalism—underpins this public sphere. 
Religious signs and practices have been silenced as the modern 
public sphere has set itself against the Muslim social imaginary and 
segregated social organization; modern codes of conduct have 
entered public spaces ranging from Parliament and educational 
institutions to the street and public transportation.136 
In the 1999 general elections, political alliances, and the 
balance of power changed dramatically. As Table 1 shows, the VP, 
the WP’s successor, lost strength in these elections. The tension 
that emerged between Islamists and secularists during the WP’s 
short term in office caused many voters to turn to the Democratic 
Left Party and the right-wing National Action Party, both of which 
kept religious issues out of election campaigns. Both parties also 
directly or indirectly put more emphasis on the nationalist 
sentiments of the masses, a strategy that earned them more seats in 
the parliament. 
Additionally in 1999, Kavakçi was elected a member of the 
parliament as a veiled woman.137 Kavakçi tried to enter the 
Parliament to be sworn in but faced outright resistance from Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit and deputies of his Social Democratic Party, 
 
 136. Nilüfer Göle, Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries, 14 PUB. 
CULTURE 173, 176–77 (2002). 
 137. Until that election, no veiled woman had been elected to parliament. 
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who saw her Islamic veiling as a challenge to the implicit rules of 
Parliament. Thus, Kavakçi could not take her seat in the parliament 
and lost her Turkish nationality on the grounds that she had 
become a U.S. national before obtaining approval from Turkish 
authorities.138 
5. Current political parties 
While the “unspoken, implicit borders and the stigmatizing, 
exclusionary power of the secular public sphere” consolidated its 
power, the Constitutional Court banned the VP on June 22, 
2001, “on charges of being a center of Islamic fundamentalism” 
and for being a “focal point” for anti-secular activities.139 Soon 
after the end of the VP, the Saadet Partisi (Prosperity Party) 
(“PP”) began representing the traditional old ideology.140 
However, divisions of opinion within the party caused a 
breakdown in the rank and file of the party, ultimately resulting in 
the establishment of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and 
Development Party) (“JDP”) under the leadership of Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, previous mayor of Istanbul.141 As shown in Table 
2, JDP won the November 3, 2002, early elections with 34.28% of 
the vote and claimed a majority in the parliament. Erdogan, 
 
 138. See Ilnur Cevik, It’s Time We Solve the Merve Puzzle, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Nov. 
23, 1999, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/11_23_99/ 
comment.htm; Headscarf Controversy Dominates Agenda as the New Parliament Convenes, 
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, May 1, 1999, available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/ 
old_editions/05_02_99/dom.htm#d5. The ban on wearing a scarf in public spaces such as 
universities and government offices still continues. In some instances, extreme measures ensure 
against women wearing a headscarf, as illustrated by an event which involved a very old female 
patient who was refused admittance into Istanbul University’s hospital because she was wearing 
a headscarf. Öktem, supra note 103, at 397–98. 
 139. Constitutional Court Bans Virtue Party, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2001, 
available at http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/06_23_01/dom.htm; Chris 
Morris, Turkey Faces EU Wrath as Court Bans Islamic Party, THE GUARDIAN, June 23, 2001, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,511377,00.html; Öktem, 
supra note 103, at 398. 
 140. See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002: TURKEY (2002), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13986.htm (last visited February 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002]. 
 141. See generally id. 
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though, remained out of the parliament because he was banned 
from politics at the time of the elections.142 
 






Justice and Development 
Party 
34.28 363 
Republican People’s Party 19.39 178 
True Path Party 9.54 1 
Nationalist Action Party 8.36 - 
Youth Party 7.25 - 
Democratic People’s Party 6.22 - 
Motherland Party 5.13 - 
Prosperity Party 2.49 - 
Democratic Left Party 1.22 - 
Other and independent 9.27 7 
 
The JDP leadership has been very reluctant to take a stand on the 
state-religion relationship and secularism. Party officials refrain from 
talking about current problems regarding restrictions on expression of 
religion in the public sphere to avoid increasing the tension between 
the secular and the more religiously oriented sections of society. For 
instance, Erdogan and other party officials have emphasized that the 
prohibition on wearing a headscarf would not be their priority in the 
office, arguing that this problem can only be solved through a social 
and political consensus, rather than by causing conflict and tension. 
Since the establishment of the JDP government in November 2002, 
the government has focused not on restriction on religion, but on 
broader issues, such as Turkey’s entry into the European Union, 
democratization reforms, economic progress, and the recent regional 
crisis involving Iraq. The JDP government not only remained silent 
 
 142. Erdogan was banned because of his previous conviction and jail sentence for reading a 
poem that allegedly incited religious hatred among the people. See HOWE, supra note 108, at 
192. It was only after the formation of a new government under Abdullah Gül’s premiership that 
the parliament made the necessary constitutional amendments enabling Erdogan to run for a seat. 
 143. 2002 statistics obtained from the Higher Electoral Board of Turkey. See generally 
DAVID SHANKLAND, THE ALEVIS IN TURKEY: THE EMERGENCE OF A SECULAR ISLAMIC 
TRADITION (2003). 
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with regard to restrictions on Islam in the public sphere, but it has also 
avoided addressing problems of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. 
C. Minority Religious Groups in Modern Turkey 
The basis for the legal status of religion and religious liberty as 
well as the nature of the state are clearly laid out in the Turkish 
Constitution. Article 2 of the constitution sets the nature of the state 
and its relation to religion. It says, “The Republic of Turkey is a 
democratic, secular and social State . . . .”144 The constitution 
provides for freedom of religion and the government generally 
respects this right in practice. Article 24 of the constitution 
guarantees this liberty as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, 
religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided 
that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14.”145 Article 24 
also provides liberty and protection for nonbelievers by stating that 
“[n]o one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in 
religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and 
convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs 
and convictions.”146 
1. Minority Islamic sects 
Although approximately ninety-eight percent of the population 
in Turkey is Muslim,147 Islam is not a monolithic religion in Turkey. 
The majority of the Muslim population are Sunni,148 but current 
perception and practice of Islam varies from mystical to folk Islam 
and from conservative to more moderate Islam. This circumstance 
has resulted from Turkish society’s exposure to various cultural 
currents throughout the centuries. In addition to the Sunni Muslim 
majority, Turkey has an estimated twelve to twenty million Alevis, a 
heterodox Muslim sect.149 Alevis freely practice their beliefs and build 
 
 144.  TURK. CONST. art. 2. 
 145. Id. pt. IV (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), art. 24. Article 14 sets the 
boundaries of these provisions, which relate to the integrity and existence of the secular state. 
 146.  Id. 
 147. See INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Reha Çamuroglu, Some Notes on the Contemporary Process of Restructuring Alevilik 
in Turkey, in SYNCRETISTIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE NEAR EAST 25, 32 (Krisztina 
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“Cem houses” (places of gathering). Many Alevis allege 
discrimination in the state’s failure to include any of their doctrines 
or beliefs in religious instruction classes (which reflect Sunni Muslim 
doctrines) in public schools. They also charge a bias in the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, which regulates the operation of the 
country’s 75,000 mosques and employs local and provincial imams, 
who are civil servants.150 Some groups claim that the directorate 
reflects mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs. No public funds are 
allocated specifically from the directorate budget for Alevi activities 
or religious leadership.151 
2. Non-Muslims 
Several non-Muslim religious groups exist in Turkey, most of 
which are concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. Since 
census results do not contain any data pertaining to the religious 
affiliation of Turkish citizens, the exact membership figures are not 
available. However, as Table 3 indicates, it is estimated that there are 
more than one hundred thousand non-Muslims in Turkey. 
 
TABLE 3: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NON-MUSLIMS152 
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION NUMBER 
Armenian Orthodox Christians 50,000 
Jews 25,000 
Greek Orthodox Christians 3,000–5,000 





Kehl-Bodrogi et al. eds., 1997); INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra 
note 140. 
Turkish Alevi rituals include men and women worshipping together through speeches, 
poetry, and dance. See ALEVI IDENTITY: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Tord Olsson et al. eds., 1998). Alevis also do not have a monolithic structure. Like the Sunni 
majority, the Alevi community has a diversity of interpretations and dozens of competing 
associations, which reflect the varieties of Islam in Turkish society. See generally ILYAS ÜZÜM, 
GÜNÜMÜZ ALEVILIGI [CONTEMPORARY ALEVISM] (1997). 
 150. For Alevi doctrines and beliefs, see ILYAS ÜZÜM, KULTUREL KAYNAKLARINA GORE 
ALEVILIK [ALEVISM ACCORDING TO ITS CULTURAL SOURCES] (2002). 
 151. Nilüfer Göle, Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-
elites, 51 MIDDLE E. J. 46 (1997). 
 152. INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140. 
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Armenian Orthodox Christians, Jews,153 and Greek Orthodox 
adherents are recognized by the government as having special legal 
minority community status under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. 
However, Baha’is, Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians,154 
Protestants,155 Bulgarian,156 Chaldean,157 Nestorian, Georgian, and 
Maronite Christians do not have the same status. Article 39 of the 
Treaty of Lausanne guarantees equality among Turkish citizens 
regardless of their religious conviction: “Turkish nationals belonging 
to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political 
rights as Moslems. All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction 
of religion, shall be equal before the law.”158 
Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty further stipulates that  
 Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy 
the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish 
nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, 
manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious 
and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for 
instruction and education, with the right to use their own language 
and to exercise their own religion freely therein.159 
Article 42 reaffirms this proposition:  
 The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to 
the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious 
 
 153. For the history of Jews in modern Turkey, see generally AVNER LEVI, TÜRKIYE 
CUMHURIYETI’NDE YAHUDILER: HUKUKI VE SIYASI DURUMLARI [JEWS IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
TURKEY: THEIR LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS] (1996); and MOSHE SEVILLA-SHARON, 
TÜRKIYE YAHUDILERI [JEWS OF TURKEY] (1992). 
 154. For the history and current position of Syriacs in Turkey, see generally YAKUP BILGE, 
GEÇMISTEN GÜNÜMÜZE SÜRYANILER [SYRIACS FROM PAST TO PRESENT] (2001); YAKUP 
BILGE, SÜRYANILER: ANADOLUNUN SOLAN RENGI [SYRIACS: FADING COLOR OF TURKEY] 
(1996); and AZIZ GÜNEL, TÜRK SÜRYANILER TARIHI [HISTORY OF TURKISH SYRIACS] (1970). 
 155. For the recent developments in Protestant Churches in Turkey, see MUSTAFA 
NUMAN MALKOÇ, ISTANBUL’DAKI PROTESTAN KILISELER [PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN 
ISTANBUL] (1999). 
 156. See generally ELCIN MACAR, ISTANBUL’UN YOK OLMUS IKI CEMAATI: DOGU 
GRITLI KATOLIK RUMLAR VE BULGARLAR [TWO LOST COMMUNITIES OF ISTANBUL: GREEK 
CATHOLICS FROM EASTERN CRETE AND BULGARIANS] (2002). 
 157. See generally KADIR ALBAYRAK, KELDANILER VE NASTURILER [CHALDEANS AND 
NESTORIANS] (1997). 
 158.  Convention Respecting the Regime of the Straits and Other Instruments Signed at 
Lausanne, July 24, 1923, art. 39, 2 THE TREATIES OF PEACE 1919–1923 (1924), available at 
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html (last visited May 26, 2003). 
 159.  Id. art. 40. 
KUC-FIN 5/31/2003  1:17 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
504 
establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and 
authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the 
religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present 
existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for 
the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of 
the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private 
institutions of that nature.160 
In spite of these constitutional provisions, non-Muslim 
minorities in Turkey have faced property ownership restrictions.161 
On January 3, 2003, the law pertaining to the property of 
community (non-Muslims minority) foundations was amended, 
lifting strict restrictions and enabling these foundations to have more 
freedom in keeping, maintaining, and purchasing new premises. 
According to the new law ratified by the parliament, community 
foundations will be able to purchase new property for religious, 
social, cultural, and educational functions, as well as for providing 
health services by the permission of the Office of Foundations, under 
more flexible conditions.162 
Additionally, since the adoption of the Law on Unification of 
Instruction in 1924, education, including religious education, has 
been under the supervision of the state.163 In 1997, the state began 
requiring eight years of primary school education, which includes 
religious instruction. However, upon written verification of their 
non-Muslim background, minorities “recognized” by the 
government under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, 
Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish) are exempt from Muslim religious 
 
 160. Id. art. 42. 
 161. The Office of Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu) restricts activities such as 
renovation and expansion of places of worship and other institutions belonging to non-Muslim 
religious groups. The Office of Foundations recognizes 160 “minority foundations” including 
“Greek Orthodox (approximately 70 sites), Armenian Orthodox (approximately 50), and 
Jewish (20), as well as Syrian Christian, Chaldean, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgian, and Maroni 
foundations.” INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140. 
 162. See Avrupa Birligi, AB Uyum Paketi Yürürlüge Girdi (Jan. 1, 2003) (Turkish), at 
http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~342@nvid~218558,00.asp. 
 163. Article 24 of the constitution states 
  Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be 
compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious 
education and instruction shall be subjected to the individual’s own desire, and in 
the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives. 
TURK. CONST. pt. IV (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), art. 24. 
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instruction.164 Other non-Muslim minorities, such as Catholics, 
Protestants, and Syriac Christians are not legally exempted; however, 
in practice, they may obtain exemptions. 
One of the long running issues regarding organizational and 
educational religious liberty in Turkey for a non-Muslim community 
is the case of the Halki seminary on the island of Heybeliada in the 
Sea of Marmara. “The seminary has been closed since 1971, when 
the State nationalized all private institutions of higher learning.”165 
“The Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul continues to seek to reopen 
the Halki seminary” to educate religious leaders and to train new 
clergy to serve the Greek Orthodox community.166 To meet the 
training needs for Greek Orthodox clergy, Faculty of Divinity at the 
University of Istanbul opened a Department of Christian 
Theology.167 Still today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not made 
any announcements or any arrangements regarding sending their 
clergy for training to this department. The Department of Christian 
Theology, on the other hand, remains defunct because it has not 
employed any experts or scholars in the field nor has it made its 
curricula public. It seems that the issues surrounding the seminary 
will continue for the foreseeable future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Turkey occupies a unique place among the modern nation-states 
not only because of its geopolitical place but also because of its 
cultural and religious heritage. Turkey’s unique position is 
strengthened by the fact that it lies at the crossroads of the diverse 
cultural and religious traditions of the East and West. These multiple 
traditions played a major role in the construction of the political and 
cultural identity of Turkish society. 
Modern Turkey was established on the ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire and inherited an imperial legacy that launched modern 
reforms during the eighteenth century in political, legal, 
administrative, educational, and cultural fields. The founders of the 
republic of Turkey adopted these reforms and accelerated the 
modernization process in Turkish society. Although some of the 
 
 164. These students may attend courses with parental consent. 
 165. INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002, supra note 140. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Öktem, supra note 103, at 376. 
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radical reforms and restrictive policies of the early republican period 
caused a cultural rupture, the fabric of the society preserved the 
resources and cultural references that make up Turkey’s unique 
identity. 
Nevertheless, despite sweeping reforms leading to the 
modernization and secularization of Turkey, Islamic values remained 
deeply rooted in Turkish society. Global revival of religion as a 
response to deteriorating social, political, and economic conditions 
began in the latter part of the twentieth century. The revival of Islam 
in Turkey gathered momentum after the 1980s because of the failure 
of the secular elite’s effort to replace religion with totally modern 
secular values. Secularization and westernization could not perform 
the metaphysical function of a religion. Private religious education, 
the development of Islamic fashion and dress, the production of 
religious music, and the publication of Islamic journals as aspects of 
the privatization wave have given Islam a new boost and made it 
pervasive in modern Turkish society. Social changes such as 
migration from rural to urban settlement areas, rapid demographic 
change, multi-party politics, and economic and industrial 
developments have all affected the revival of Islam in Turkey. 
Although Turkey has improved its democracy since its 
establishment, problems regarding state-religion relations still 
remain. For example, Turkey has no separation of state and religion 
as do other countries such as the United States and France.168 The 
state ideology not only permeates public institutions, but it also 
draws the boundaries of the public domain. Certainly Turkish 
democracy still requires improvement to become more inclusive and 
accommodating of religions and to find an appropriate balance 
between religion and secularism in a nation that is almost entirely 
Muslim. Nevertheless, Turkey is an exemplary nation that shows 
Islam and modern democracy can peacefully coexist. 
 
 
 168. For instance, although the state defines itself as a secular establishment, it 
accommodates a large state machinery called the Directorate of Religious Affairs, whose 
employees are civil servants. Nonetheless, Turkish interpretation of secularization finds no 
problem with integrating this office into the state administrative system. Consequently, the 
directorate is occasionally accused of promoting “state Islam.” 
